Abstract: We present a number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols. We also advance a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited.
The Order of Encryption and Signature
We will start by expanding on the fth principle from AN94].
Principle 1: Sign before encrypting. If a signature is a xed to encrypted data, then one cannot assume that the signer has any knowledge of the data. A third party certainly cannot assume that the signature is authentic, so nonrepudiation is lost.
This was motivated by attacks in which the opponent could remove a signature from an encrypted message and replace it with one of his own | X.509 CCITT88] su ered from such an attack. However, there is an even more powerful attack on several protocols which do encryption before signature, including X.509 and a number of the proposals in ISO CD 11770 ISO94a] .
Suppose that Alice wishes to use RSA RSA78] with a modulus of 500 -600 bits to send Bob the message M. The standard technique would be for her to rst sign the message with her private key and then encrypt it with his public key. However, suppose that Alice rst encrypts M under Bob's public key and then signs it with her private key. Denoting the modulus, public exponent and private exponent of party by n , e and d , and ignoring hashing (as it makes no di erence to our argument), the signed encrypted message would be:
fM eB (mod n B )g dA (mod n A )
This is vulnerable, and in a novel way. Since Bob can factor n B and its factors are only 250{300 bits long, he can work out discrete logarithms with respect to them and then use the Chinese Remainder theorem to get discrete logs modulo n B . So if he wants to get Alice's`signature' on a di erent message, M 0 , he can nd x such that M 0 ] x = M (mod n B )
He then registers (xe B ; n B ) as a public key with a certi cation authority, and claims that the message signed by Alice was not M but M 0 .
This provides a direct attack on CCITT X.509, in which Alice signs a message of the form fT A ; N A ; B; X; fY g eB (mod n B )g and sends it to Bob. Here T A is a timestamp, N A is a serial number, and X and Y are user data. It also breaks the draft ISO CD 11770; there, Y consists of A's name and a random challenge in key agreement mechanism 5, and A's name followed by a session key in key transport mechanisms 2, 5 and 6.
The attack is not limited to RSA: it works with ElGamal too Elg85], provided this time that Bob can choose his own modulus. Recall that in ElGamal the message m is encrypted to (r; c) where r = g k (mod p), c = y k m (mod p), the message key is k, the recipient's private key is x, and his public key is y = g x . Suppose that Bob selects a so-called`trapdoor' modulus, under which he can work out discrete logarithms RLS+92]. Then, for any given m 0 , r and c, he can nd a suitable y 0 such that (y 0 ) k = m 0 =c.
The obvious countermeasure, of requiring all users to share the same modulus, may be politically di cult, as attempts have been made in the past to foist suspect moduli on the user community And93a].
Key spoo ng attacks are also possible on symmetric systems. For example, given a message M and a ciphertext C, the e ort required to nd a key such that C = fMg K is about 2 55 when the algorithm used is single key DES, but thanks to the birthday problem it is only 2 28 or so with double key DES. There are systems where a single, double DES encrypted block is used to authorise a payment, such as described in And92b] | although that particular system is not vulnerable as one of the two keys is xed. With public key systems, key spoo ng attacks seem easy to prevent | just always sign before encrypting. However, inverting the order of encryption and signature is a surprisingly common misfeature. A recent internet cash proposal Oto94] also used it, and Kailar pointed out that this destroyed accountability in the invoicing system Kai95]. Our attack goes further; it could allow invoices to be forged. It also dents a protocol for anonymous credit cards LMP94] 1 .
Encryption before signature can also cause problems for formal veri cation techniques. The BAN logic ignores the algorithm issues, but at least it will not verify that Alice signed M in equation (1) above as she has no jurisdiction over n B . Kailar's logic also rejects a signed encrypted message.
However, the veri cation tools which do try to deal with algorithm properties (such as those discussed in KMM94]) do not seem able to deal with this attack at all. In order to x this, the scope of their assumptions may need to be extended; one conventionally worries about the factorisation properties of RSA keys, not their discrete log properties, and the worry about trapdoor primes has been that users might be attacked by authority, rather than by each other.
In any case, it is prudent to sign before encrypting.
Spot the Oracle
Nonrepudiation is complicated by the fact that signature and decryption are the same operation in RSA, which many people use as their mental model of public key cryptography. They are actually quite di erent in their semantics: decryption can be simulated, while signature cannot. By this we mean that an opponent can exhibit a ciphertext and its decryption into a meaningful message, while he cannot exhibit a meaningful message and its signature (unless it is one he has seen previously Here we are using the standard notation from BAN89]: CX is a certi cate containing the public key KX of participant X; the corresponding private key is KX ?1 ; N X is a nonce generated by participant X; K AB is a shared secret between Alice and Bob (which it is the purpose of the protocol to generate), and Sam is the key distribution centre.
There are a number of problems with this protocol, including the obvious one that Bob has no assurance of freshness (he does not check a nonce or see a timestamp). However, a subtler and more serious problem is that Alice never signs anything; the only use made of her secret is to decrypt a message sent to her by Bob. The consequence of this is that Bob can only prove Alice's presence to himself | he cannot prove anything to an outsider, as he could easily have simulated the entire protocol run. The e ect that such details can have on the beliefs of third parties is one of the interesting (and di cult) features of public key protocols: few of the actual or proposed standards provide a robust nonrepudiation mechanism, and yet there is a substantial risk that many of them may be used as if they did.
We shall return to this topic later. For the meantime let us just say that we must be careful what we mean by`Bob'. This may be`whoever controls Bob's signing key', or it may be`whoever controls Bob's decryption key'. Both keys are written as KB ?1 in the standard notation, but they are actually rather di erent.
Principle 2: Be careful how entities are distinguished. If possible avoid using the same key for two di erent purposes (such as signing and decryption), and be sure to distinguish di erent runs of the same protocol from each other. Beaver's attack on Den Boer's oblivious transfer protocol falls into this category: when the same public key primitive is reused in the oblivious transfer context, various sneaky attacks become possible Bea92]. Also, Landrock recently pointed out that if someone uses the same key in the ISO protocols for signature and zero knowledge proof, there is a massive security failure: the zero knowledge protocol can be used as an oracle to generate signatures Lan95].
Woo and Lam's protocol also su ers from an oracle problem: if decryption and signature are performed using the same key, then Sam can be impersonated. This is because between messages 4 and 5, he decrypts a nonce N A sent to him encrypted under his own public key.
Even where keys are only used for one purpose, there may still be an oracle attack; a recent example was found in the documentation for Lotus Notes Internals Dwo94]. Oracle attacks can be xed in various ways, such as by explicit typing of nonces, or by using di erent keys for di erent purposes (as Lotus apparently do in their current implementations). However, they can sometimes be quite subtle, and an interesting example is the attack found by Simmons on the TMN (Tatebayashi-Matsuzaki-Newmann) scheme.
Here, two users want to do a key exchange, but with a trusted server doing most of the work ( We will sum all this up simply as Principle 3: Be careful when signing or decrypting data that you never let yourself be used as an oracle by your opponent.
Count the Bits
We mentioned above the need to distinguish di erent runs of the same protocol. This means, for example, that systems based on discrete log typically need a fresh message key for each session, which brings us to the topic of subliminal channels. The message keys in ElGamal type schemes contain various covert channels. For example, 160 of the 320 signature bits in the digital signature standard give security | apparently making the computational security O(2 80 ) | but the other 160 bits are available for covert communication Sim94b].
Counting bits is not always as straightforward, as it may involve speci c properties of the public key primitive. One of the earliest examples of an attack on a public key protocol is due to DeMillo and Merritt, who showed that a poker protocol leaked information through quadratic characters DM83]. A similar attack has been reported by Lomas on a protocol of Mao.
Subliminal channels may seem rather abstract, but counting the precise amount of redundancy can bring us right down into the muddy details of particular implementations. It has been known since the earliest days of public key cryptography DH76] that digital signatures are inherently vulnerable to attacks by forward search | an attacker applies your public key to a lot of random signatures until (with luck) she gets something which she can pass o as a message from you.
Such attacks can in principle be prevented by putting enough redundancy in each message to be signed. However, it is common to rely on naming information and counters for this purpose, and this can lead to errors | especially if neither the cryptologist nor the system designer pays attention to the other's work.
Consider ISO 11166 ISO94b]. Here, as in X.509 and ISO CD 11770, encryption is done before signature; but as the RSA exponent is xed, the key spoo ng attack of section 2 above does not work. However, an attacker can just as easily replace the modulus and do a forward search.
How much e ort will this take? In ISO 11166, the protected message consists of a key used to authenticate banking transactions, an eight bit key control vector, and a 56 bit counter. However, the standard speci es that if the user receives a count which is higher than the retained value, he should accept it and send a service message con rming the new count. Assuming that the attacker can intercept and discard this message, the counter contains only one bit of real redundancy, and so forging a message is trivial.
The e ects of this are surprisingly subtle. For example, public key certi cates must be checked anew with every key service message. If they are cached in the local host after checking, then programmers could forge a key service message to their own bank and could then authenticate a bogus transaction.
Another problem with ISO 11166 is that the redundancy in the key certicates is rather low. It is apparently 45 bits for a short certi cate, but depends on the redundancy of the namespace for a long certi cate; this means that the redundancy will steadily deteriorate. If in future there were 30,000 banks sharing the US banking namespace, then the search e ort might be as little as 2 42 modular multiplications | a large computation, but not large enough to stop a determined attacker. We conclude Principle 4: Account for all the bits | how many provide equivocation, redundancy, computational complexity, and so on. Make sure that the redundancy you need is based on mechanisms which are robust in the application context, and that any extra bits cannot be used against you in some way.
Assume Nothing
We will next look at a number of related types of protocol failure, which are nicely illustrated by a pernicious attack which Burmester found on protocols by Goss, G unter, Yacobi and the EC's RIPE project team Bur94]. These protocols try to fortify Di e Hellman key exchange by adding authentication. As an example, we will consider the Goss protocol Gos90], which is apparently used in the German railway system.
Here, there is a common prime p and a generator g of a high order subgroup of Z p . Each user U has a secret key x U and a public key y U = g xU . At each run of the protocol, user U generates the random number r U . Alice There is an easier way to look at this attack: Alice supplies g rA to Bob, and Bob returns to her (g rA ) xB | so Alice can try to send him an arbitrary z and get back z xB . In fact, she gets back y rB A z xB and knows only the rst of these two terms, but given the key which Bob thought he generated she can work out z xB . Thus if Bob lets old message keys leak, he will have allowed himself to be used as an oracle for his own secret operation, namely raising numbers to the exponent x B .
Anyway, Burmester described the aw in these protocols not as an oracle attack but as a consequence of failing to consider what might happen if a counterparty failed to keep an old message key secret. A number of other protocols fail if a message key is later revealed, and some early examples can be found in BAN89]; Simmons' attack on the TMN protocol provides another example. We therefore propose as our next principle:
Principle 5: Do not assume the secrecy of anybody else's`secrets' (except possibly those of a certi cation authority).
A related error is to make simplifying assumptions about the kind of messages which an opponent might insert in the course of an attack. The weakness in the Goss protocol which we discussed above can also be interpreted in this way: once one sees that the number received from the other party is not necessarily g r , for some r known to either the other player or an attacker, but can be any number z, then the existence of an oracle attack becomes obvious.
However, there have been other attacks in the same mould which principle 5 does not tackle. Desmedt and Burmester broke a`proven' secure protocol by showing that the opponent did not have to act in a nice (simulatable) way DB93], and a number of server assisted signature schemes have also failed in this way And92b]. We therefore state as a separate principle:
Principle 6: Do not assume that a message you receive has a particular form (such as g r for known r) unless you can check this.
Next, we have to look at conspiracy attacks on threshold schemes and other multiparty constructions. These have caused a lot of confusion in the past, and perhaps the obvious thing to say would be something like \It is prudent to make explicit the number of conspirators against whom security is claimed".
But we need to go further. One of the present authors proposed a scheme for hiding trapdoors in RSA public keys And93a] which turned out to be vulnerable to an attack by lattice basis reduction once a certain number of keys had been generated Kal93]. We have also seen above that some encryption algorithms are vulnerable to key spoo ng. So the next principle is a bit more general:
Principle 7: Be explicit about the security parameters of crypto primitives. A key generation routine should be claimed as good for so many keys; a threshold scheme for resistance to so many conspirators; a block cipher for so many blocks; and so on.
Of course, some of the above principles overlap, and Burmester's attack is particularly interesting as it can be construed in di erent ways | as the consequence of the Goss protocol's failing to observe principles 3, 5 or 6 (at least). However, we are not trying to provide a minimal set of principles; a certain redundancy of robustness concepts is unlikely to do us any harm.
Finally, there are principles which are either too algorithm speci c, or too general, for the level of abstraction at which we are trying to operate. Consider for example Coppersmith's attack on NIKS-TAS, a scheme which combines discrete exponentiation with combinatorics Cop94]. One might formulate a principle that one should shield secrets behind the public key primitive rather than the combinatorics, or one might adopt Coppersmith's own conclusion that in a discrete log scheme one should always have the secret information`upstairs' and the public information`downstairs'. However, it is unclear that either of these is general enough for our list.
At higher levels of abstraction, we have`engineering commonsense' such as the KISS principle (`Keep It Simple Stupid'), which cryptographers often ignore. Many highly complex schemes are proposed for digital cash and other applications, and many of them turn out to be unsound (e.g., TT94]). Proof is no panacea: several`proven' secure systems fail because of unexamined assumptions PW91] PW95], and others omit to provide desirable properties such as unlinkability Yac94] and arbitration Kai95]. Of course, particular schemes may breach one or more of our principles, as they often concatenate a number of public key primitives without hashing or redundancy in order to achieve exotic e ects. This is a subject of ongoing research interest.
6 The Explicitness Principle Looking at the above seven principles, we are led to ask whether there is any overarching principle of which the others are in some sense instances. We propose the following, which one of us put forward in the computer security context in And94a] and the other in the general protocol context in AN94].
Principle 8: Robust security is about explicitness; one must be explicit about any properties which can be used to attack a public key primitive, such as multiplicative homomorphism, as well as the usual security properties such as naming, typing, freshness, the starting assumptions and what one is trying to achieve.
With symmetric key algorithms it is often possible to treat the algorithm as a black box, as symmetric block ciphers have a certain amount of muddle in them. For example, it is not common to nd that the internals of DES interact malignantly with the way you use it. However, the known asymmetric algorithms are much more structured 2 , and depend on fairly straightforward mathematical operations such as integer or matrix multiplication. Thus they are much more likely to interact with other things in the protocols they are used with, and we have to be that much more careful.
Thus it is prudent to hash data before signing it, using a hash function which does not interact with the signature scheme. In an ideal world, signature schemes would be proof against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, but in the real world it seems that we can only achieve this by combining hashing with signature, and by being very explicit about what properties of our signature scheme we wish our hash function to mask.
A good example is correlation freedom. Until fairly recently, it was thought su cient for a hash function to be one-way and collision-free Dam87]. Then at Crypto 92, Okamoto de ned correlation freedom to be the property that we cannot nd M 6 = M 0 with h(M) and h(M 0 ) agreeing in more bits than we would expect to nd from random chance. He conjectured that correlation freedom was strictly stronger than collision freedom, and this was proved in And93b]. Since then, Vaudenay has shown that MD4 is not correlation free, and Knudsen has established the same for the hasing mode of SAFER K-64 Knu95].
Here, the explicitness principle is wider than the concept of resistance to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. For example, we may also have to protect message keys: in the Schnorr signature scheme Sch89], we must not have h(g r ; m) equal to f(k) + h(g r+k ; m) for any function f which our opponent is able to compute. It is also wider than any possible set of freedom properties (collision freedom, correlation freedom, multiplication freedom, ...) And93b].
The explicitness principle can be applied to algorithms as well as protocols. We saw above, for example, that algorithm designers should be explicit about the di culty of nding key collisions on a given message-ciphertext pair. Another example is the persistence of attacks on hash functions based on modular multiplication, such as that proposed with X.509, where a failure to make the round function su ciently multiplication free leads to attacks based on techniques such as lattice basis reduction Cop89]. However extending the explicitness principle too far into the domain of algorithms would take us away from the subject matter of this paper.
Finally, our standard disclaimer: the weaknesses we have discussed do not necessarily imply that any given system based on a protocol criticised above is insecure, as there are many ways to implement compensating controls. However, it is prudent to avoid using standards which are questionable, and which make security depend closely on application detail. Once the application code is brought inside our security perimeter, we lose the advantages of a trusted computing base; we run the risk of unpredictable security failures as documented in And94a]; and we acquire the legal exposures described in And94b]. Ignoring prudent design practice can be just as expensive in cryptography as in other branches of engineering.
Conclusion
We have tried to extend the prudent engineering principles of Abadi and Needham to the world of public key protocols, which are even more prone than conventional ones to subtle errors, and thus may be even more in need of robustness guidelines. We do not claim that our proposed principles are either necessary or su cient, just that they are useful; at least, we have found them to be useful both in looking for attacks and in explaining this subject to new students.
